One Hat Too Many:
The JFC and Component Command

A MONOGRAPH
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Second Term AY 00-01

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge several people who have been a tremendous source of guidance and encouragement in accomplishing this study. From the beginning, my monograph director, Dr. Stephen Coats, had a clear vision of what this monograph could be. He helped to keep me motivated and focused. In fact, the idea for the research question was facilitated by Dr. Coats' Joint Force Command seminar that I attended during Command and General Staff College. He dedicated a significant amount of time and effort in helping me to organize my thoughts. He also edited multiple versions of this monograph. I thank him for his patience as he pulled me through the research process.

Most importantly, I wish to acknowledge the tremendous love and support given to me by my wife, Dee Dee, and daughters Madeline, Brooke, and Grace over the course of this last year. More specifically, the monograph often took my attention away from them, yet they never complained. They patiently remained at my side, providing me with their help and understanding. They have my utmost love, appreciation, and respect for their sacrifices throughout the year. Thank you!

Abstract

The joint force commander (JFC) and his staff are increasingly challenged with emerging complexities of the 21st Century security environment. The purpose of this paper was to analyze the joint force command environment, trying to assess the factors that influence a JFC's ability to effectively prosecute dual-hatted responsibilities. More specifically, the research investigated to determine whether it is in the best interest of the joint force and the overall objectives of the theater campaign to have a JFC dual-hat himself as a subordinate functional or Service component commander in a major theater of war.

The analysis started with an examination of the commander in chief's (CINC's) environment by way of legislation, doctrine, and international developments. The purpose of this analysis was two-fold: First, to make the reader clearly aware of the JFC's complex environment, to include the CINC's roles and responsibilities; Second, to highlight the preeminent task of organizing an effective command and control (C2) structure for the entire force. The analysis then proceeded to look at the true aim of an effective C2 structure: the ability to empower the decision-maker and his staff with superior situational awareness and an ability to make better decisions faster than the adversary. Situational awareness (SA) is the dominant feature that gives a JFC the ability to comprehend and predict future actions within his theater. A C2 structure that enables high SA acknowledges the cognitive limitations of humans and sets an acceptable span of control that optimizes the workload of the JFC and his staff. The analysis concluded with historical examples of three JFCs who dual-hatted themselves as subordinate component commanders.

The issue was and is one of effectiveness for a JFC. The JFC can help his cause by maintaining a theater perspective through organizing an effective command and control structure that embraces the complexities of his environment. The JFC and his staff are susceptible to information overload, task saturation, and poor situational awareness. The implication is these varying effects could lead to ineffective decisions that involve an entire joint/multinational force. If the CINC decides to dual-hat himself as the JFC and a subordinate component commander, he will not be able to direct his attention, focus, and efforts towards theater responsibilities. Instead of concentrating on the "big picture", he will become task saturated with details of his component fight and lose situational awareness at the theater level. For these reasons, a JFC should not commit himself, and his staff, to component command responsibilities in a major theater of war.

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Chapter I
Introduction

In studying the evolution of joint force command since World War II, it is easy to see and appreciate the strides taken to eliminate Service parochialism and build a mindset of "jointness." This general practice of organizing, equipping, training, and fighting the Armed Forces as a unified team elicits the maximum effect from the capabilities of each Service. The synergy that results from the Services' synchronized and integrated action is required if worldwide national interests are to be supported and defended.[1] The unity achieved through command structure, interservice relationships, and organizational restructuring has been fueled by real world experiences, commanders' personalities, civilian intervention, and changes in the way America wages war. Consequently, the Department of Defense possesses superior military capabilities as the United States of America enters the 21st Century. Does this mean the U.S. military has reached the zenith of joint organizational skills and no longer needs to seek improvements to the way joint forces organize, equip, and train?

Historically, organizations accepting the status quo and demonstrating an unwillingness to change are destined for defeat, no matter what the field of competition. This fact is particularly true under the backdrop of armed conflict. The joint force commander (JFC) and his staff are increasingly challenged with the new and changing complexities of the emerging security environment of the 21st century. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the joint force command environment, trying to identify any factors influencing the ability of a JFC to effectively prosecute dual-hatted responsibilities at a subordinate level of war. More specifically, the research will investigate to see whether it is in the best interest of the joint force and the overall objectives of the theater campaign to have a JFC dual-hat himself as a subordinate functional or Service component commander in a major theater of war.

First, the boundaries of this study need to be defined with regard to the strategic environment in which joint operations are to be discussed. Military operations can range from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to unlimited war. The research effort focuses on the worst case scenario of armed conflict with a peer competitor. In doing so, the analysis will encompass scenarios that endanger our national interests as outlined in the 1999 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS). In the context of this discussion, combat forces will conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve our strategic goals. These combat operations assume U.S. military forces are part of a substantial joint effort consisting of all four Services as well as a multinational coalition.

Second, with the boundaries of this analysis defined, the primary focus of this investigation is directed at commanders in chief of geographic unified commands (CINCs) as a JFC in a major theater of war. Nevertheless, the insights and analysis suggested at the CINC-level are applicable to the other types of organizations under JFC command authority such as a subordinate unified command or a joint task force. The bottom-line is this command consists of a large number of organizations and forces from different Services and nations, providing a very complex situation for the JFC to orchestrate.

Third, an overview of doctrinal terms, command and control relationships, and authorities given to CINCs is required at this time to put the research question in context. Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, defines the terms that make up the authorized command relationships and authority military commanders can implement. The terms "unified command," "specified command," and "combatant command" refer to commands established by the President as combatant commands under title 10, United States Code, section 161. The acronym "CINC," which means commander in chief, refers to the commander in chief of a combatant command. The term "joint force commander," or JFC, is used in a generic sense to refer to the commander of a combatant command, subordinate unified command, or a joint task force. Adding the word "geographic" to CINC or combatant commander describes a combatant commander of a unified

command that includes a general geographic area of responsibility. Similarly, affixing the word "functional" to CINC or combatant commander describes a combatant commander or a unified command with functional responsibilities.[2]

CINCs exercise combatant command (command authority) over assigned forces and are directly responsible to the National Command Authorities (NCA) for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform assigned missions.[3] This direct link to the highest authorities of our country ensures a unity of effort designed to facilitate coordination among government departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and nations in any alliance or coalition.

The term "unified action" is a generic term referring to the broad scope of activities taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. Unified action integrates joint, single-Service, special, and supporting operations, in conjunction with interagency, nongovernmental, private voluntary organizations, multinational, or United Nations operations, into a unity of effort in the theater or joint operations area. Thus, unified action becomes the military instrument employed, often in conjunction with other instruments of national power, to achieve national objectives as outlined in U.S. strategy. Unified action is normally accomplished by establishing a joint force, assigning a mission or objective to the JFC, establishing command relationships, assigning or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the JFC with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission.[4]

JFCs are a critical link between the NCA, NSS, National Military Strategy (NMS), and plans for employing military forces. JFCs must understand their roles and responsibilities with respect to the three different levels of war. The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions.[5] Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, defines these levels as the following:

Strategic: Level of war at which a nation determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national or multinational objectives. Strategy derived from policy, is the basis for all operations.

Operational: The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art – the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Joint operational art, in particular, focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces.

Tactical: Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use their full potential.

The analysis will start in Chapter II with current legislation that establish and authorize the myriad roles and responsibilities assigned to a CINC. The geographical CINCs' authorities were expanded in 1986 to promote efficiency and accountability by giving them command of operations involving all four of the Services assigned within specific geographical regions of the world. Out of this legislation has grown a library of joint publications that provide the distilled wisdom gained from the experiences of all Services in warfare and other operations requiring the use of the military instrument of national power.

Joint doctrine's purpose is to disseminate these warfighting lessons throughout the Armed Forces to enhance performance fighting as a joint team. From the accompanying guidance within the joint publications rises one responsibility that demands the utmost attention of a joint force commander from the very start of a campaign. In some respects, the most important and challenging task to conquer is organizing an effective command and control (C2) structure for the entire force. The aim of the C2 structure is to enable both vertical and horizontal information flow and feedback throughout the chain of command which enables the JFC to make a much more qualitative decision faster than the adversary.

The CINCs' roles and responsibilities, as defined by law and doctrine, will then be considered in the context of recent international developments of the post-Cold War era to fully appreciate

the complexities of the JFC's environment. These roles and responsibilities have evolved into making the CINCs into one of the most influential policy maker and diplomat in their specific regions.[6] This is not to imply that senior military leaders have not influenced foreign policy in the past, but there is a perception that trends in the post-Cold War environment have pushed uniformed CINCs into expanded diplomatic and political roles.

To succeed in this complex environment the CINC must possess a keen insight and ability to make critical decisions covering a wide area of issues. Chapter III will address the cognitive aspects of decision-making as it relates to command and control. Therefore, it is imperative that the JFC and his staff possess a well-organized and coherent command and control structure. This structure will empower the decision-makers with improved situational awareness to make more effective decisions. The real dynamics of the C2 structure and situational awareness relationship lies within the cognitive limits of an individual or a group to perceive, comprehend, and predict future actions. Thus, this research examines the human cognitive performance issues that affect situational awareness such as information overload, task saturation, attentional resources, and focus "tunneling". What are the implications if a CINC tries to cover the whole spectrum from diplomacy to tactical schemes of maneuver? Will the CINC and his staff become vulnerable to task saturation and low situational awareness resulting in poor performance, poor decisions, or inaction?

The JFC must have excellent situational awareness, a large dose of intuitive skills, and a broad vision of political and military events. These abilities will enable the JFC to maintain "the big picture" and make effective decisions under time-critical scenarios that require course of action shifts or campaign transition. The ability of a JFC and his staff to focus and prioritize at the strategic and operational levels of warfare make or break the effectiveness of the joint force. Historical accounts of JFCs dual-hatting as subordinate component commanders will reveal the complexities of their environment as well as the importance of task distribution and optimizing span of control within their commands.

As is the case with any other profession, it is critical to look objectively at the U.S. Armed Forces history to absorb and understand the contextual elements of today's environment, and more importantly, tomorrow's unforeseen challenges. The analysis in Chapter IV will survey the organizational history of American theaters of operation over the last fifty years, including WWII, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. Each one of these major conflicts possessed a joint force command structure with a JFC dual-hatted as a subordinate component commander. By analyzing these past dual-hatted command relationships, past JFC and staff's performances might be more objectively assessed and critiqued, increasing the chances of incorporating lessons learned into future command and control designs.

Chapter V will conclude with a comprehensive analysis to see if there is a limit or vulnerability to a CINC's ability to successfully prosecute all of the roles and responsibilities, while maintaining situational awareness at the theater level of war. In the future, CINCs caught up in inefficient command relationships, poor situational awareness, and information overload run the risk of making command decisions that lead to the inexcusable loss of life, resources, and the campaign. An efficient and effective command and control structure used wisely can help the JFC avoid these pitfalls.

Chapter II
JFC's Roles and Responsibilities: A Complex Environment

A joint force commander will not function in a dual capacity as joint force commander and as commander of a component of his force, unless so directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[7]

-JCS Directive: Unified Command for Joint Operations   20 April 1943

The Joint Chiefs issued the directive cited above only sixteen months after the United States entered World War II. The JCS created the policy in response to deteriorating relations between Services and coalition partners, particularly under the command of General Douglas MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific Area. The organization of command and control during WWII was paramount to the success of the joint or coalition force. To this day, the responsibility of organizing a joint force command and control structure remains one of the most important functions a JFC can perform. The idea of an organization's effectiveness still rests on the shoulders of a JFC, just as the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it important in 1943. How an individual combatant commander organizes his command and control structure is a direct result of his leadership style and how he envisions his roles and responsibilities during conflict. To what level of war should the JFC's focus be directed? Should this level of war perspective affect how to organize a command and control structure with unity of effort and span of control at the forefront of considerations?

This monograph focuses on a geographic combatant commander (CINC) fulfilling the role of a JFC within a major theater of war. In trying to define and understand the complex environment of a CINC, this chapter will begin with a review of legislation that describes principles and policies governing unified action of forces. The next resource to be investigated is the doctrinal perspective of a CINC's roles and responsibilities within the JFC's environment. Lastly, there will be an exploration of recent international developments and ever-increasing global awareness requirements of a CINC. As the JFC's roles and responsibilities are exposed, keep in mind their main focus and the level of war they affect. At what level(s) of war have the roles and

responsibilities congregated and what conclusions can be drawn about the JFC's environment? Critical analysis will suggest where the JFC should spend the majority of his time, attention, and effort during a campaign. Figure 2.1 assists in helping to visualize the diverging tensions influencing the CINC's environment under a dual-hat scenario.


Figure 2.1 Levels of War and the JFC

The complexities of a CINC's environment today are partly attributable to sweeping legislation called the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Highlights of this legislation that directly affect a CINC's roles and responsibilities are as follows: [8]

> In enacting this Act, it is the intent of Congress, consistent with the congressional declaration of policy in section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401)—
>
> (1) to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;
> (2) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;
> (3) to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
> (4) to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;
> (5) to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
> (6) to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

The overall thrust of this legislation was to establish a stronger civilian authority within the Department of Defense, add clarity and simplicity to the chain of command, inject a more strict and enforceable line of accountability to joint commanders, and create a culture of teamwork among the four Services and other agencies (Figure 2.2 depicts command relationships at the strategic level). The CINCs' ability to influence the nation's highest levels of civilian leadership substantially increased with the Goldwater-Nichols Act. These commanders have constitutional, legal, and professional obligations to provide sound advice and recommendations on the military aspects of national security to national leaders in the executive and legislative branches.


Figure 2.2 Chain of Command and Control[9]

To appreciate the contextual elements of the JFC's environment, consider the roles and responsibilities of a CINC and JFC described in joint doctrine. The synthesis of current doctrine presents the realization that a JFC assumes a challenging array of jobs, roles, and responsibilities. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, captures the major functions of the combatant commander which are listed in Attachment 1.[10] More specifically, command and control doctrine highlights the importance of clear and simple command and control structures for effective organizations.

One of the most important responsibilities vested in a JFC is the command authority to organize and employ forces under his command. Command, and its accompanying relationships and expectations, are central to all military action. Unity of command is paramount to the central idea of unity of effort. The command relationship called combatant command (COCOM) is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands by title 10, US Code, section 164, or as directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan (UCP). This level of command authority cannot be delegated or transferred. COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing forces, assigning tasks, and designating objectives. It enables the CINC to give authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to his command.[11]

The effectiveness of a joint force command is directly related to the command relationships orchestrated by the JFC. Joint Pub 0-2 articulates important concepts the CINC should adhere to when organizing joint forces:

> Sound organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. When organizing joint forces with multinational forces, simplicity and clarity are critical. Complex or unclear command relationships or organization are counterproductive to developing synergy among multinational forces.[12]

Joint doctrine allows the JFC the latitude and authority to organize the forces under his command to best accomplish the assigned mission based upon his projected concept of operations. The JFC, or in this case the CINC, can adopt a command structure using any or all of the following six options: subordinate unified command, joint task force, functional component, Service component, single-Service force, or specific operational forces.[13] A trend that will likely continue to influence the JFC's command and control decision in future conflicts is the dependence on unified actions that must synchronize joint, multinational, and interagency capabilities due to dwindling resources. Therefore, efficiency and effectiveness of joint forces will continue to grow in importance. To stay within the context of a major theater of war scenario, the most appropriate and viable command structure would likely entail the functional component option. Organizing by functional components requires that the similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related objectives. Unity of command and effort are primary considerations in establishing these components.[14] The rest of this analysis will focus on the CINC and functional component command (See Figure 2.3).

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
Figure 2.3 Possible Functional Component Chain of Command[15]

Within this particular command structure, joint doctrine discusses the commander's focus and task distribution and offers the JFC the opportunity to delegate authority to subordinates to accomplish missions. This arrangement allows subordinate commanders to focus on tactical operations while the JFC maintains a broader theater perspective. Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, expands on this very important concept under the topics of unity of command, unity of effort, and span of control. This task distribution or focus recommendation plan between levels of war is referred to as a two-tiered system and was successfully employed in Operations URGENT FURY (Grenada, 1983), JUST CAUSE (Panama, 1989), and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti, 1994).[16] The effect of the two-tiered system is to permit the JFC from being influenced and distracted by the details of the close-in fight. Instead, he can focus on operational or strategic theater objectives.

Nevertheless, joint doctrine specifically allows the JFC to be dual-hatted as a component commander, but states it is not recommended due to the blurring of responsibilities among the levels of war. The warnings of dual-hatting within the command and control structure give very little detail on the cause and effects of this particular command structure. The small amount of information on dual-hatting explains the complexities of the environment and the problems of focus, span of control, training, task saturation, and low situational awareness. JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, does allude to possible shortfalls of dual-hatting a JFC as a Service component commander:

> Although normally not recommended, the CJTF also may be a Service component commander. When this is the case, the commander retains all the responsibilities associated with the Service component command. Dual-hatting a Service component commander as the CJTF may place this commander in an unwieldy position, foster a parochial single-Service or component view of overall joint operations and component contributions, and create potential conflicts of interest.[17]

There is no comprehensive joint publication to address a CINC's role and responsibilities as both a JFC and a functional component commander in a major conflict. The only specific mention of a JFC requirement to assign a functional commander is in JP 3-0:

> JFCs will normally designate a JFACC, whose authority and responsibilities are defined by the establishing JFC based on the JFC's concept of operations.[18]

The implementation of this guidance enables the two-tiered system to take effect. It discourages the JFC from functionally commanding air operations. Therefore, the CINC can focus on all facets of the strategic/operational level of war, while the JFACC orchestrates air operations at the operational/tactical level of war. If JFCs do not designate component commanders when multiple land, sea, and air forces are in theater, they have effectively dual-hatted themselves at that subordinate level. This command and control structure injects a new level of complexity into the JFC staff and other functional components that must coordinate and synchronize activities at the operational level of warfighting. This type of arrangement lacks simplicity and unity of effort while increasing the JFC's task workloads and span of control at a level of war that is directly related to tactical actions. Some specific Services have realized the JFC's compromising situation when he acts as a subordinate commander. The United States Air Force clearly identifies with the above concerns with regard to JFACC appointees:

> The JFC normally should *not* serve as a functional or Service component commander. For example, a US Air Force JFC should not also be the COMAFFOR or the JFACC.[19]

USAF doctrine recognizes the sheer magnitude of workload and responsibilities that the JFC possesses. Here is acknowledgment of a limit to how much a JFC and his staff can maintain a focus on the theater perspective while trying to plan and execute tactical level warfighting.

Beyond the basic command and control decision, the JFC must assign tasks, designate objectives, and give authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations. This responsibility also includes joint training and the logistics necessary to accomplish the mission assigned to the command. Expanding on the functions and responsibilities of a JFC, Joint

Publication 5-00.2 reveals a wealth of insight into the complexity of commanding a joint force. A complete list of a JFC's roles and responsibilities, as enumerated JP 5-00.2, is presented in Attachment 2. Although the title of the publication alludes to a specific command structure option and size of force (JTF), the concepts within the document have applicability to other joint force structures.

With both law and doctrine defining the CINC's roles and responsibilities, this analysis will transition to the evolving functions, which are being applied in greater occurrence in today's environment. Exploring recent international developments and the newly formed roles of CINCs will help define the complex environment of a CINC. More often than not, the routine duties of contemporary CINCs have shifted and expanded into diplomatic and political roles rivaling State Department functions and activities. Another reason for these new roles in the strategic environment, besides being empowered by Goldwater-Nichols, could be the fall of the communist block. A decade has passed since the end of the Cold War, and with it has gone the consistent and predictable bipolar structure of the world and its accompanying international relations. With the fall of the USSR, the international security environment has become quite complex and volatile and the CINCs have responded very successfully by implementing solutions to the engagement strategy advanced in the NSS. CINCs operate in the political sphere of influence and are often confronted by other problems that are not necessarily military in nature. In fact, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, peacekeeping and military operations other than war (MOOTW) have dominated military operations.

A quick glimpse at the last ten years will show that U.S. Armed Forces have been tasked with four times as many real world deployments with approximately 60% of the original forces at the end of the Cold War.[20] Post-Cold War strategies of cashing in on a peace dividend have continued to exert painful pressures on the resources and manpower of the Armed Forces. In order to successfully meet future military challenges effectively into the 21st Century, CINCs will

increasingly need to take full advantage of the synergy provided by the unified action of joint forces and interagency organizations.

Joint Pub 0-2 illustrates the complexity of synchronizing unified action within the framework of time, space, and purpose. Here is a list organizations or entities that the CINC and his staff might need to coordinate with to reach a desired endstate:

National Command Authorities	State Department
Coalition or Alliance Diplomats	Supporting Combatant Commands
Coalition or Alliance Forces	Sister Service Component Commands
Functional Component Commands	Federal Government Agencies
Non-military organizations	Media
Non-governmental organizations	United Nations
Multinational Corporations	U.S. Congress
CJCS	Ambassadors

This is not a complete list, but a general representation of the different groups or organizations in which the JFC must interact and understand their areas of interest and concerns. By looking at this diverse group of organizations, it is easy to envision how susceptible this environment is to the debilitating effects of complexity and chaos. Possessing this insight and the accompanying relationships of these organizations will enable the JFC to avoid cognitive paralysis and make qualitatively better decisions in a timely manner.

A recent set of articles written by Dana Priest for *The Washington Post*, Dana Priest outlines the effects of this sweeping reorganization effort directed at the Armed Forces in 1986. Priest focused on the subsequent evolution of the CINCs since that legislation, suggesting they are the modern-day equivalent of the Roman Empire's proconsuls—well-funded, semi-autonomous, unconventional centers of U.S. foreign policy.[21] An example of this relatively new found power was exposed during the recent Pakistani military coup in October of 1999. The world waited anxiously for words from the Army general who was now in charge of a nuclear-capable, unstable nation. When the general finally decided to talk with the world about Pakistan's

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intentions and future, the telephone call was not to a head of state, Prime Minister, or any other formally accepted position of dialogue. Instead, the Pakistani general telephoned U.S. Central Command's combatant commander, General Anthony Zinni who oversaw U.S. military operations in the Middle East. "Tony," the Pakistani general began, "I want to tell you what I'm doing…"[22] This interaction did not occur accidentally. In the case of General Zinni, he had built personal relationships that transcended diplomatic techniques and institutions. Yet, the CINCs' role of diplomacy and their ability to influence is much more sophisticated and robust than their predecessors have wielded. These geographic combatant commands have become resourced, manned, and trained to influence at the strategic level of global interactions and are quite effective at executing autonomous regional policy.

The purpose of analyzing the CINC's environment by way of legislation, doctrine, and international developments is two-fold: First, to make the reader clearly aware of the JFC's complex environment with all of it's accompanying roles and responsibilities. Second, to highlight the preeminent task of organizing an effective command and control structure for the entire force. Granted, the JFC inherits a large joint staff with the best and brightest to handle the details of all these issues. But, the fact still remains the JFC is the single most critical decision maker that can influence the joint/multinational coalition during conflict and he must maintain high situational awareness. The JFC can help his cause by maintaining a theater perspective through organizing an effective command and control structure that embraces the complexities of warfare. The CINC is in a very difficult, challenging position. He and his staff can be susceptible to information overload, task saturation, and poor situational awareness. The implication is these varying effects could possibly lead to ineffective decisions that involve an entire joint/multinational force. Further insight into the cognitive capabilities and limitations of the decision-makers must be known to tailor an effective C2 structure to handle all the complexities of the this particular environment.

Chapter III
The Human Element

In studying a CINCs' complex environment, it becomes readily apparent how important the command and control structure postures the JFC and his staff to maintain a theater perspective. But, the organization of the C2 framework is just the means to the end. The true aim of an effective C2 structure is to empower the decision-maker and his staff with superior situational awareness and an ability to make better decisions faster than an adversary. The focus of this chapter is to understand the connection between a JFC's complex environment and an individual's ability to comprehend and predict future actions: that is, the human element. Understanding the relationship between environment and individual is critical for a JFC and his staff when contemplating the addition of dual-hatted responsibilities. First, the concept of situational awareness will be discussed and defined to understand the strategic aim of an effective command and control structure. Second, there will be an in-depth discussion that covers the human cognitive capabilities and limitations of information processing. The input of critical information into the decision-making process is mandatory if an organization hopes to achieve high situational awareness. Finally, this chapter explores the workload dynamics of individuals or groups, seeking to uncover any insights that might be related to task saturation and low situational awareness.

The human elements just described are studied in the science of human factors. Human factors is defined as the technology concerned to optimize the relationships between people and their activities by the systematic application of the human sciences, integrated within the framework of system engineering.[23] This technical definition needs further explanation to understand the essence of human factors. Technology, in this sense, is defined as the practical study of tools, skills, and professional beliefs to solve man-system interface problems in a natural setting. Human sciences comprise those studies covering structures and nature of human beings, their capabilities and limitations, and their behavior.[24] More simply put, the science of human

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factors researches fitting the system to human limitations. The study of the man-system relationship is done in the "field" with close interaction with the actual system operators, soliciting their insights and needs. Once human factors scientists are armed with this critical information, they can make effective inputs into the design and operation of each system. It is not within the scope of this discussion to investigate every complex issue and detail within the study of human factors. Nevertheless, the connection between a JFC's situational awareness (SA), focus, attention, and workload help the reader better understand the importance of command and control relationships within a joint force.

Situational awareness is defined as the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is a state of being or consciousness with varying levels of awareness to a particular event or situation. The definition highlights the importance of a JFC's ability to accumulate multiple sources of information simultaneously from his own staff, the NCA, interagency organizations, subordinate functional or component commands, and the surrounding environment. Obviously, many variables influence the quality of a JFC's SA to include training, focus, experience, and task workload. The definition highlights three distinct phases of SA, which are perception, comprehension, and projection.

In this respect, when describing SA, an assumption is made that there are different levels of SA. Level 1 SA, the lowest level, occurs when a commander simply perceives the cues surrounding him and the influx of information but does not have the time or capacity to get "ahead" of the situation. This level of SA assumes the JFC simply reacts to events or situations as they occur with no real hope of seizing the initiative. The JFC achieves level 2 SA when he understands events due to knowledge and experience. This comprehension and ability to form patterns allows the JFCs and their staffs to make the jump to the highest level of SA. The JFC staff team, at level 3 SA, utilizes both previous levels to analyze and project the situation into the near or distant future.[25] A joint force operating at this level is proactive, having efficiently

prioritized and managed incoming sources of information while still owning a surplus of attentional and cognitive resources to comprehend and project a particular situation. To operate at this third level, a JFC must understand the situation rather than just perceive the situation.[26]

By attaining this level of predictive battlespace awareness, or "big picture," the JFC can remain focused on the phases of a campaign and appropriate branches and sequels. As the campaign develops and the "fog and friction" of war appears, the decision maker will need to make timely and critical decisions in the midst of stress and high workloads. It is imperative for the JFC and his staff to maintain the highest SA level at these critical times in the campaign to enhance decision-making performance.

Situational awareness is an outcome, a product that results from effective situational awareness management. The separate Services, and for that matter the Joint Force, acknowledge the importance of senior leaders and staffs having high situational awareness. In today's information age, our command and control organization and training should emphasize how to gain and maintain SA, as well as to recognize when SA has been lost or degraded. Many intelligence officers offer the example of when a JFC or staff detects a lack of awareness in a specific area, they can simply direct their attention toward that area through various techniques to regain awareness. This process is situational awareness management. However, this example is not the worst case scenario that must be anticipated. The problem is the JFC and his staff would require some level of self-awareness to detect their shortfall in this environment. If SA is not maintained, the JFC and his staff will surrender any initiative they might have had and succumb to predictive reactions. As the effects of lost SA take hold, the JFC and his staff will tend to concentrate on familiar lanes of expertise, comfort zones, or less complex issues to regain situational awareness. This natural tendency may invite individuals to gravitate to the tactical level of war, where the majority of their experience has been cultivated. This vulnerability of the human mind to drift toward "the weeds" to regain SA will have debilitating side effects for the theater campaign. What is not desired in this complex cognitive environment is a command and

control structure that requires JFC staff teams to purposefully focus attention and effort toward the tactical level of war. Staff teams need to realize this possible consequence of dual-hatting, as well as the perceived control gained by this command structure.

The goal is to maximize the amount of time JFCs possess Level 3 situational awareness, providing them an opportunity to make better decisions toward mission accomplishment and an endstate that is desirable to the NCA. Level 3 situational awareness enables the JFC and his staff to possess a proactive posture, prepared to handle deviations from the original plan. Situational awareness is difficult to gain and maintain yet quite easy to lose with just a few seconds of misdirected attention. It is imperative that JFCs are trained and equipped with the correct tools and command and control relationships to manage situational awareness in all types of scenarios. Again, the rewards of Level 3 situational awareness can be directly attributable to an efficient and effective command and control structure, which can be the most important responsibility the JFC possesses at the outset of a major theater of war conflict.

Another source of complexity added to the JFC's environment is the increasing amount of information being fed to and analyzed by JFC staff teams. Many experts have argued recently whether the United States is currently in a revolution of military affairs (RMA), with the emergence of what is being called the Information Age.[27] That specific debate will not be addressed in this research. However, the premise of an ongoing RMA implies that there are changes occurring, or that have occurred, in the areas of doctrine, organization, and technology. Of these three elements, changes in technology are the most readily understood and accepted catalyst of an RMA. There have been astonishing leaps in information storing and manipulating technology that have thrust the United States into the Information Age. The cumulative effects of these technologies, which were intended to increase situational awareness and lethality, can have the opposite effect. Situational awareness can be diminished due to task saturation brought on by technical advances. With the majority of our focus on the technological aspects of warfighting, very little study has been focused on the ability of the human mind to comprehend and act after

analyzing this enormous amount of information. It is not just the quantity of information processed that is important to the decision-maker or JFC. The most important aspect of collecting information is the ability to filter out the critical information and translate it into knowledge for the JFC to make qualitatively better decisions in a relatively quicker period of time than an enemy. This relationship can be broken down into the ability of the brain to capture and prioritize critical information during dynamic situations, to analyze the situation or problem correctly with the increased workload after the information is attained, and to take appropriate action in a disciplined manner.

In a JFC's complex environment, attention demands due to information overload, complex decision making and multiple tasks can quickly exceed limited cognitive resource capacities. Attention requirements increase significantly when subjected to high risk or high workload phases of an operation. The more prepared the JFC is to assimilate large amounts of information in a dynamic situation, the greater the likelihood is that he will make informed decisions.[28] High situational awareness is acquired and maintained by knowing how and when to divide and focus attentional resources. In doing so, courses of action can be narrowed and chosen immediately with an insightful cost and benefits analysis. This idea emphasizes the importance that experience plays when dealing with all the complexities that surround a JFC.

The cognitive psychology community, as a whole, is becoming more interested in how leaders make high-pressure decisions in an astonishingly short amount of time. They are finding growing evidence that pattern recognition, or the ability of an individual to apply attention resources to recognizing patterns and extracting applicable experiences from long-term memory, plays a dominant role in decision making. An individual's database of applicable experiences comes from a number of sources to include training, simulators, education, and real life experiences. A growing number of researchers have moved out of the laboratory to work in the area of naturalistic decision making—that is, the study of how people use their experience to make

decisions in field settings.[29]   The dynamics that interact within this stage of the information

process are extraordinary and are trying to be understood by professionals in this field.

One of these experts is Gary Klein, author of *Sources of Power.*   He offers insights into the

dynamics and complexity of attention resources and focus and the critical role they play within

the information process of the decision-maker. Mr. Klein's naturalistic decision making studies

focused on groups of professionals including firefighters, pilots, nurses, military leaders, nuclear

power plant operators, and chess masters. The common thread that ran through these different

professions was their everyday requirements to excel in situations driven by time pressure, high

stakes, inadequate information, unclear goals, cue learning, and dynamic conditions. Given an

acceptable span of control or level of war to focus on, experienced leaders showed an ability to

cut through a complex situation and orient on the relevant cues and discard the distracting ones

because of their superior situational awareness.[30]   Thus, workload level, focus, and situational

awareness are directly related. Is there a limit to a JFC's situational awareness during a major

theater of war scenario? Without augmentation, the more forces a JFC staff team directly

controls, through dual-hatting, the greater the workload thrust upon the staff team. The liabilities

of task saturation must be weighed and analyzed.

Exploring workload dynamics of individuals and groups can expand and articulate the

relationships between workload, task saturation, low situational awareness, and overall

performance. By reviewing all of the JFC's roles and responsibilities during a conflict, it is

apparent that the staff team is very susceptible to becoming task saturated. Human factors

research has demonstrated that the workload of an individual is a very important determinant in

causing human error and poor decisions.[31] Human performance, under most circumstances, is

most reliable under moderate levels of workload and stress that do not change suddenly and

unpredictably. High levels of workload and stress are obviously going to increase the likelihood

of poor judgment. This is another liability that must be considered when considering the dual-

hatted command and control structure. The other extreme happens when workload or stress is too

low and boredom sets in and the decision-maker is lulled into not properly attending to the task at hand.[32] Everyone operates most effectively somewhere between these two extremes at some moderate level of stress.

The relationship between workload and performance has been repeatedly proven and verified.[33] At very low levels of stress or workload, motivation and attention are minimal and results in poor performance. On the other end of the spectrum, at very high levels of stress and workload, panic and task saturation set in and performance deteriorates dramatically. A visual representation will enforce this idea in Figure 3.1. As mental workload increases, there is a point where the effects of task saturation start dominating the individual accompanied by low situational awareness, which results in poor performance and decisions. JFCs must continuously balance unity of command and span of control, trying to achieve optimum performance levels. Constructing an efficient and effective command and control structure from the outset of an operation can be the hardest endeavor a commander will face in the campaign.

Mental Performance

Optimal Performance

Boredom Complacency

Task Saturation/Low SA

Workload/Stress

Figure 3.1. Relationship between Workload/Stress and Performance[34]

The factors found to have an influence on mental workload are task distribution and unexpected events.[35] Distribution of duties is probably one of the most important factors

influencing workload. This point talks directly to the issues of span of control and focus as discussed earlier in doctrine. Again, the command and control structure is at the heart of these issues and is the driver behind an individual or staff's workload. As previously discussed, the joint publications warn the reader that it is very important to posture the JFC to avoid task saturation. Joint publications have tried to dissuade JFCs from dual-hatting themselves and their staffs at the component command level, but offer little depth to the actual reasoning behind the guidance. The science of human factors offers explanations to the possible consequences of dual-hatting a JFC staff team at a subordinate level of war. Yet, historical examples continue to grow in the face of this simple wisdom. The goal is to keep all organizations at every level of warfare in that optimal performance zone as depicted in Figure 3.1, resulting in the most efficient and effective fighting force.

The last factor influencing mental workload is unexpected events, which play critical roles in causing workload and stress levels to reach unmanageable levels. Unexpected events disrupt the normal execution of a campaign plan and cause JFC staff teams to work outside of their normal patterns of perceiving and comprehending the new situation. If they are in a reactive mode of SA, JFCs become vulnerable to task saturation, loss of focus, and poor decisions. The "fog and friction" of unexpected events in conflict are a natural phenomenon and must be anticipated. Therefore, to avoid task saturation and low SA, it is imperative that JFCs, through the establishment C2 relationships, acknowledge the likelihood of these occurrences and keep the theater perspective at the forefront of their minds.

The cognitive elements of a decision-maker and his staff must be taken into account when systematically studying the relationships of their roles and responsibilities against their environment. In doing so, elevating the situational awareness of the decision-maker should be the true aim of the staff and the surrounding command and control structure. Situational awareness is the dominant feature that gives a JFC the ability to comprehend and predict future actions within his theater. By recognizing the importance of SA, the JFC must understand and prioritize the

staggering amounts of information that saturates his environment. The organization of a command and control structure that facilitates SA acknowledges the cognitive limitations of the human brain and sets an acceptable span of control that optimizes the workload of the JFC staff team.

Chapter IV
A Historical Look

The issue was and is one of effectiveness for a JFC. Chapter II's research highlighted the JFC's complex environment that included the CINC's roles and responsibilities. More specifically, the JFC can help his cause by maintaining a theater perspective through organizing an effective command and control structure that compensates for the complexities of his environment. The CINC is in a very difficult, challenging position. Chapter III offered the analysis that the JFC and his staff are susceptible to information overload, task saturation, and poor situational awareness. The implication is these varying effects could possibly lead to ineffective decisions that involve an entire joint/multinational force. If the CINC decides to dual-hat himself both as JFC and a subordinate component commander, then he may not be able to direct his attention, focus, and efforts towards his theater responsibilities. Instead of concentrating on the "big picture", he may become task saturated with the details of his component fight and lose situational awareness at the theater level. The JFC must realize that theater issues outweigh purely tactical military considerations and demand leadership from a commander who understands this dynamic and can influence the joint force from the theater perspective.

Some leaders of joint and coalition forces have met this challenge. Others have been unable to relinquish control over the tactical level activities of their campaign due mainly to ineffective command and control structures. An analysis of several conflicts and selected commanders that fit all of the constraints and boundaries defined in Chapter I makes this point. The following case studies involve JFCs whose organizations consist of large formations of forces from different Services and nations fighting to impose their will against a formidable enemy. The commander is given a very complex scenario to orchestrate. For reasons that the situations dictated, the organizations' command and control structures allowed the joint force commander to dual-hat himself at a subordinate level.

These historical examples all take place since the beginning of WWII, essentially the birth of our military's efforts to fight as a joint force. Over the last half-century, U.S. concepts of operational warfare evolved and matured into distributed operations, durable formations, continuous logistics, and operational vision. Single climatic battles deciding the fate of a war were outdated. Nation-states had come into being and were the primary combatants. Men who led during these times were generally focused on administration and diplomacy, as opposed to earlier times when they were expected to personally lead the battle charges. Generals and admirals prosecuted campaigns to attain strategic results. Try not to judge the following case studies strictly in terms of who won or lost. There are as many lessons to be learned from a victory as there are from a defeat.

First, starting with the Pacific Theater during WWII, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's dual-hatting command experience will be reviewed to see if that C2 framework facilitated an efficient and effective organization. Next, the Vietnam War will expose a dual-hatted situation that was dysfunctional from the beginning and partially to blame for the poor strategic performance of our military forces. Finally, General Norman Schwarzkopf's performance will be evaluated during Desert Shield/Storm as he commanded as both the JFC and de facto land component commander.

Although there were many different factors that produced friction in the Pacific during WWII, such as Service parochialism and leader personalities, a common weakness of poor command relationships infected the theater throughout the war. Admiral Nimitz contributed to the confusion by exercising direct control of considerably more forces under his command than his peer, General MacArthur. In addition to his command of the Pacific Fleet, he also commanded directly two of the three geographic areas established under his command.[36] The wisdom of such a command and control structure concerned the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C. Nimitz's response to these concerns was his argument that delineating his theater command from the area and fleet commands would build an unresponsive set of subordinates and unneeded coordination bureaucracy for an upcoming offensive.

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Thus, he thought Washington's proposed division of commands would lead to decision-making being slowed down, which in his mind was undesirable for the upcoming theater campaign. His solution was to augment his current staff to look after the subordinate commands. As a result, each of the headquarters grew in size and became less manageable and efficient than the small headquarters he eventually maintained.[37] This would lead Louis Morton to comment on interservice relations in the Pacific Theater and the effectiveness of Nimitz's multi-hatting:

> Like MacArthur, he was prohibited from interfering in the internal administration of the forces in his theater, but as a fleet commander he remained responsible for naval administration as well as operations. He was thus answerable to himself in several capacities, and it was not always clear whether he was acting as area commander, fleet commander, or theater commander responsible to the Joint Chiefs in Washington. This fact and the failure to define precisely the relationship between Admiral Nimitz and General Emmons, the Army Commander in Hawaii, created much difficulty.[38]

This particular command and control structure created confusion for organizations interacting with Admiral Nimitz and his staff. To compound the situation, Admiral Nimitz's staff was essentially the same staff that handled all three of Nimitz's command work.[39] This is a great example of how JFC staff teams become task saturated by a commander dual-hatting himself. By default, a JFC's staff becomes dual-hatted, or multi-hatted, unless the JFC designates a different staff for the additional workload. Lack of augmentation at the staff level can lead to an organization's task saturation, low situational awareness, and poor performance.

Another element of friction produced by Admiral Nimitz's multi-hatted command, besides an organization becoming task saturated, is one of JFC orientation. Along with directing strategic theater concerns, Admiral Nimitz's command of the Central Pacific Area and the Pacific Fleet presented a scenario of a theater commander focused on subordinate responsibilities and issues. This situation invited Admiral Nimitz and his staff to concentrate on the tactical level of war and lose situational awareness of supply and logistic requirements at the theater level. This critique of lost focus is identified by Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commander of U.S. Army Services of Supply, in the following analysis:

Admiral Nimitz had become so involved in details and so preoccupied with the local situation that he had lost sight of "the general picture" and thereby reduced his effectiveness as theater commander.[40]

Admiral Nimitz's multi-hatting created much consternation and confusion among the organizations that dealt with his commands. Additionally, as Somervell highlighted, Nimitz's inclination to fix on tactical issues, because of human limitations as discussed in Chapter 3, invited the CINC and his staff to lose the theater perspective. Surely, the organization of a command and control structure is not supposed to yield these results; nevertheless, the Pacific command relationships that were established threatened to diminish the effectiveness of the joint force.

The next historical example involves General William C. Westmoreland and his experiences in the Vietnam War. Although he was the JFC of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), a subunified command, the lessons learned are related to the current analysis. General Westmoreland, as COMUSMACV, directed all U.S. military operations in South Vietnam. His responsibilities included air operations within South Vietnam and an "extended battle zone" north of the demilitarized zone. Air operations against North Vietnam and in the panhandle of Laos were generally conducted by CINCPAC through the commanders of the Pacific Air Forces and Pacific Fleet. Consequently, undivided responsibility and unified direction of the war were conspicuously absent.[41]

Westmoreland chose to command both the joint force and the U.S. Army Service component. This decision to command and control at a subordinate component level complicated an already confusing scenario. His effort to create a dual-hatted command and control structure did not go unopposed. He nevertheless prevailed when he argued that a senior commander should be allowed wide latitude in organizing his command. General Bruce Palmer, Westmoreland's Deputy Army Commander and author of *The 25-Year War*, best articulated the sheer amount of tasks added to MACV's already complex environment when he wrote:

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In this way General Westmoreland and MACV staff directly controlled all U.S. operations; directly commanded all Army elements; directly managed the U.S. assistance and advisory effort; directly performed the politico-military functions of an allied theater commander, overseeing the activities of the numerous allied units and agencies in Vietnam; and directly advised and supported the U.S. ambassador in South Vietnam.[42]

The reason given to control both the joint and the Army command was to mirror the command and control structure of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff. General Palmer's analysis concludes that the benefits received by doing this were greatly outweighed by MACV and his staff's susceptibility to become task saturated. The responsibility overload visited upon MACV's staff team produced a lack of focus within the organization and eroded performance effectiveness. Palmer offers that if Westmoreland would not have dual-hatted himself, and his predominantly U.S. Army staff, MACV could have focused purely as a joint theater headquarters. This redistribution of tasks and responsibilities could have enabled the joint commander to concentrate on the politico-military matters that arose daily at the strategic level of war.[43] In turn, the subordinate Army component staff team would have concentrated on controlling and synchronizing ground operations with the other Service components.

Westmoreland saw himself as strictly a warrior caught in a political situation. In, *A Soldier Reports*, Westmoreland declares, "Despite the military nature of my assignment in South Vietnam, it was impossible to keep my activities entirely separate from the political turmoil that soon gripped the country."[44] This statement suggests that Westmoreland grudgingly recognized that he was the vital link to craft military operations to support the political aim of stabilizing the volatile political landscape existing in South Vietnam. He had limited himself to being a reluctant warrior who was being dragged into a political sphere of influence.

His ability to prioritize and focus on the strategic level of war was limited due in part to his command and control structure. Not only had General Westmoreland preferred being a strictly military man, he was almost exclusively an Army military man. An example of this inclination is illustrated when he wrote: "Why place an Air Force officer in a position where he might have to

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run what was essentially a ground war? I similarly resisted pressures for an equal quota system for officers of the various Services on the MACV staff.[45] He essentially employed an army staff to plan for and execute a joint campaign. Nevertheless, not only were Westmoreland and his staff task saturated from dual-hatting, they also misdirected their focus and efforts toward their comfort zone of ground tactical fighting. Through his statements and actions, Westmoreland was a land component commander—not the ideal choice to maintain a theater perspective.

Years after Westmoreland grappled with the challenges of Vietnam, U.S. forces went to war in the Persian Gulf. Although the Gulf War was a military success, there are many lessons learned from that conflict that still are being analyzed today.   One of the areas that is still creating interest is the command and control structure organized by General Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, CINCCENT. As JFC he deployed, organized, and employed the world's largest coalition, creating enormous command and control challenges. Some of these challenges emerged as the result of General Schwarzkopf's decision to dual-hatting himself as the JFC and the JFLCC. Reasons for this C2 arrangement include political sensitivities of multinational command relationships and the speed at which this organization had to be assembled. Either way, Schwarzkopf was aware of the potential downfalls of this arrangement and he still did not adjust the command and control structure at a later time.

Operation Desert Storm's command structure reflected General Schwarzkopf's experience, personality, and the personalities of his subordinate commanders. He chose to split command of the land forces between US Army Forces, Central Command (ARCENT) commanded by Lieutenant General Yeosock, and US Marine Forces, Central Command (MARCENT) commanded by Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer. General Schwarzkopf, dual-hatted as CINCCENT and land component commander, devoted little time to the duties associated with the JFLCC. The absence of a dedicated JFLCC and staff started to take its toll, causing friction within the JFC's planning process and continued until war termination.

Despite the presence of ARCENT as a numbered field army, it functioned more as a theater army responsible for logistics, not warfighting.[46] This produced a situation where no single unified voice advocated the position of the land forces horizontally to the joint force air component commander or other component forces and ensured that even land operations would not be synchronized. Nominally, Lieutenant General Calvin Waller, USA, Deputy Commander in Chief CENTCOM (DCINC) was injected into the planning process after three weeks into the air campaign. This was a direct response to the ground commanders' concerns and requests, making him responsible for all land force issues during coordination meetings.[47] The results from this attempt to fix horizontal and vertical communication problems within the joint force were ineffective. The same constraints that Schwarzkopf endured with his self-inflicted command and control structure were imposed on General Waller: competing priorities, a JFC staff unable to accept additional responsibilities, and the absence of a dedicated JFLCC staff to deal with intractable joint issues.[48]

Thus, dual-hatting the JFC as the JFLCC created a span of control and focus challenge for the JFC and his staff during the planning phase, which eventually led to task saturation and loss of situational awareness during execution. General Schwarzkopf even admitted to his dual–hatted command position being vulnerable to task saturation and problems of focus in the following observation:

> I found myself mired in administrative chores: briefing congressional delegations, giving press interviews, heading off cultural problems with the Saudis, and fielding bureaucratic questions from Washington.[49]

Similar to other historical examples reviewed, individuals emerged, like General Colin Powell, to suggest that Schwarzkopf might want to establish a JFLCC to lessen his span of control and lighten his workload to focus on the theater perspective. Nevertheless, General Schwarzkopf and his staff declined to address the issue.

From the start, CENTCOM's objective was not just to defeat the Republican Guard, render it "combat ineffective", or chase it out of southern Iraq. The objective was to destroy the Republican Guard. But that objective was not accomplished. More than half of the Republican Guard escaped to Iraq. The failure to destroy the Republican Guard was due in part to poor communication skills and synchronization problems on the ground. The synchronization problem and the different rates of march between the VII Corps and the 2nd Marine Division should have been identified and highlighted in the planning phase by a dedicated and focused land component commander and then confirmed by monitoring combat operations.

As Desert Storm commenced combat operations, Gen Schwarzkopf's focus toward the tactical level of war increased as the inevitable "fog and friction" of war gained momentum. The JFC staff team started losing the "big picture." This absence of theater awareness is illustrated by Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor who wrote:

> Schwarzkopf failed to recognize the significance of the battle of Khafji and how it had challenged CENTCOM's basic assumption that the Iraqis would stand and fight. Nor did it acknowledge how its plan to let the Marines launch an all-out attack to the gates of Kuwait City while holding back the main Army attack made it easier for the Iraqis to get away. Instead, he blamed Franks for the failure to complete the destruction of the Republican Guard.[50]

Another example of the JFC not attending to strategic issues was the Gulf War's termination criteria. The untidy end to the conflict showed that it is not enough just to plan a war. Civilian authorities and military leaders must analyze and plan for the desired political and military endstates. General Schwarzkopf had the overall responsibility of mission success and achieving directed objectives. In hindsight, Desert Storm was one of the most decisive combat victories in modern history. Nevertheless, the JFC's low situational awareness of the battlespace allowed him to render false advice on war termination timing based on incomplete information and premature battle assessment. General Powell and the White House decided to end the war based on initial, fragmentary intelligence reports instead of waiting for a fuller accounting.[51]

The confusion that surrounded the ground war operations was a detriment to unity of effort and decentralized execution. The corps commanders' concerns went unnoticed for three weeks into the war until the position of a land component commander was filled by the DJFC. The personal attacks abounding between the corps commanders and the JFC since the war have been vicious and well documented by all parties in autobiographies and Gulf War books. The command and control structure was instrumental in producing confusing communications, a lack of synchronization between the land forces, and unfulfilled objectives.

The case studies have shown a wide array of possible problems associated with a JFC dual-hatting himself and his staff as a subordinate component commander staff team. The ability of a JFC staff team to efficiently and effectively handle all of the responsibilities of a JFC and a subordinate functional commander is overwhelming. The workload and responsibilities within these scenarios make the decision-maker become reactionary with an inability to focus on strategic/operational issues at the theater perspective. Thus, within this dual-hatted command and control structure, there comes a higher level of friction and chance of making wrong decisions for the joint fighting force.

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Chapter V
Conclusions and Recommendations

The genesis of this research paper came from a simple reality: there are limitations as to the amount of information a person can perceive, comprehend, and process in order to make effective decisions. This reality was then incorporated with ideas from the Joint Force Command seminar taken at the Command and General Staff College. Readings for that course included historical examples of commanders who maintained direct control of large forces. Thus, the desire was conceived to analyze the joint force command environment and the ability of a JFC to effectively prosecute dual-hatted responsibilities at a subordinate level of war. More specifically, the research investigated to see whether it is in the best interest of the joint force and theater campaign to have the CINC dual-hat himself both as JFC and a subordinate component commander in a major theater of war.

Within the boundaries of the specific research question, Chapter II began with the 1986 legislation that established and authorized the myriad roles and responsibilities assigned to a CINC. The Goldwater-Nichols Act articulated a wide array of roles and responsibilities that gave CINCs an unprecedented power and influence within their geographic regions. From that point, the analysis considered joint publications to reveal details concerning the authority of a JFC. Synthesis of current doctrine presented the realization that CINCs and other JFCs possess a challenging array of jobs, roles, and responsibilities. Within this analysis was found a specific responsibility that was perceived to hold more importance than the others, almost as if it was the "center of gravity," or core of all responsibilities.[52] It was assessed that the organization of an effective command and control structure for the entire force demanded special attention from the JFC. The aim of this structure is to enable an efficient and effective information flow and higher situational awareness that gives the JFC the ability to make qualitative decisions faster than an adversary.

There also existed a wealth of information describing recent international developments that have pushed CINCs into expanded diplomatic and political roles. More and more, CINCs operate in the political sphere of influence and are often confronted by other challenges that are not necessarily military in nature. This post-Cold War trend demands a commander who possesses a keen insight and an ability to make critical decisions covering a wide range of issues. Analyzing the JFCs environment through legislation, doctrine, and current trends resulted in the acknowledgment of its complexity.

Chapter III considered the human element and analyzed the ability of a JFC and his staff to perceive, comprehend, and predict future actions in the complex environment outlined in Chapter II. Human factors science calls this ability or outcome situational awareness. A JFC's situational awareness can be high (Level 3) or low (Level 1) and is directly related to whether a JFC is going to be proactive and maintain initiative or remain reactive to the adversary's actions. Key determinants of situational awareness are complexity of the scenario, information flow, task distribution or workload management, attentional resources, and the ability to focus on priorities as appropriate. The organization of an efficient and effective command and control structure that facilitates situational awareness acknowledges the cognitive limitations of the human brain. An effective C2 structure sets an acceptable span of control that optimizes the workload of the JFC staff team. Dual-hatting a CINC and his staff expands their responsibilities, challenges their theater focus, compromises their situational awareness, and sets the conditions for diminished command effectiveness.

Rooted in the CINCs' complex environment and the decision-maker's cognitive aspects, Chapter IV offered three historical case studies that explored dual-hatted JFCs. The common theme that emerged from these experiences: dual-hatted command and control structures created an enormous amount of workload for the JFC staff teams and resulted in task saturation and low situational awareness. Whether to regain their awareness or just to gravitate toward something familiar, JFC staff teams would shift their focus to the tactical level of war. Their inability to stay

oriented on the theater perspective lent itself to poor decision-making. On the other hand, in the last example the JFC (Schwarzkopf) stayed focused on theater-based issues during planning and created a command/leadership void at the functional component level. In this case, the functional component was left out of discussions and decisions with peer organizations because the JFC was not looking out for their interests and issues. This lead to decentralized planning and unsynchronized concepts of operations within that specific component. The effects of the functional component's inability to integrate and synchronize lead to the theater campaign being adversely affected by the dual-hatted role of the JFC.

The JFC and his staff are increasingly challenged with new and changing complexities of the emerging security environment of the 21st Century. The JFC staff team is responsible for envisioning a concept of operations and military objectives for the coalition/joint force that will achieve strategic objectives. They are responsible for organizing all the forces and allocating resources that will satisfy the JFC's vision and concept of operations. The JFC sets the missions and priorities and directs the coordination between the subordinate commands. His ability to synchronize and integrate all available forces and effects is the most important aspect of leading an effective joint force. The task that requires a large amount of attention resources is the orchestration of unified action, within the context of employing our nation's four instruments of power. This enormous tasking is put directly to the JFC. He must ensure that the planning, integration, and execution of unified actions set the conditions for mission success and the achievement of national strategic objectives. The cognitive linking of national security, national military strategy, and theater strategies by way of command and control organization is one of the CINC's fundamental tasks.[53]

In   conclusion,   the   JFC   is   the   critical   decision-maker   who   influences   the joint/multinational/interagency force during conflict.   He must maintain high situational awareness.   The JFC can work to achieve predictive battlespace awareness by effectively organizing a joint force with an effective command and control philosophy that accounts for the

complex environment in which he operates. This monograph showed a dual-hatted JFC and his staff are susceptible to information overload, task saturation, and poor situational awareness. The implication of these varying effects could lead to ineffective decisions made for an entire joint/multinational force. For these reasons, a CINC should not commit himself and his staff to component command responsibilities during a major theater of war campaign.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense must acknowledge the vulnerabilities of JFCs dual-hatting themselves and prohibit such command arrangements. If this course of action is not acceptable and dual-hatting is the most attractive political and militarily feasible command option, several alternatives may alleviate the effects of an inefficient and ineffective dual-hatting JFC. First, the JFC might create two staffs or augment his staff with enough trained and experienced personnel to handle the responsibilities of the subordinate command. In this way both staffs can focus on their appropriate level of war without becoming task saturated and lose situational awareness. Second, prepare a joint publication to address CINC's roles, responsibilities, and issues when fulfilling JFC duties for a major conflict. Complement this document with leader and staff training as to the adverse effects of trying to gain excessive direct control of forces under their commands. The consequences of organizing command and control structures under this model must be well documented and taught in the hope that the trend to organize dual-hatting JFCs is reversed through education and common sense.

Terms and Definitions

Campaign: A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Campaign Planning: The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the National Command Authorities select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Combatant Command: A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Combatant Command (command authority): Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Commander's Estimate of the Situation: A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. A commander's estimate which considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions, is called a commander's long-range estimate of the situation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Command Relationships: The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the authority of commanders in the chain of command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Concept of Operations: A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander's concept. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Coordinating Authority: A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Functional Component Commander: A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Force: A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, or two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Force Commander (JFC): A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC): The joint force air component commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The JFACC's responsibilities will be assigned by the , JFC (normally these would include, but not limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the JFC's apportionment decision). Using the JFC's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the JFACC will recommend to the JFC apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC): The commander within a unified, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of land forces, planning and coordinating land operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The JFLCC will normally be the commander with the preponderance of land forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC): The commander within a unified, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of maritime forces and assets, planning and coordinating maritime operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The JFMCC will normally be the commander with the preponderance of maritime forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC): The commander within a unified, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The JFSOCC will normally be the commander with the preponderance of maritime forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Operations: A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Multinational Operations: A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

National Military Strategy: The art and science of distributing an applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

National Security Strategy: The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called national strategy or grand strategy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Operational Art: The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the JFC's strategy into operational design, and , ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities of all levels of war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Operational Authority: That authority exercised by a commander in the chain of command, defined further as combatant commander (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or a support relationship. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Operational Control (OPCON): Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.

Operational Level of War: The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Preventive Diplomacy: Diplomatic actions, taken in advance of a predictable crisis, aimed at resolving disputes before violence breaks out. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Service component command: A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations and installations under the command including the support forces, that have been assigned to a combatant command, or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Situational Awareness: The perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is a state of being or consciousness with varying levels of awareness to a particular event or situation.

Specified Command: A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Strategic Level of War: The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Tactical Control (TACON): Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Theater of Operations: A subarea within a theater of war defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Theater of War: Defined by the National Command Authorities or the geographic combatant commander, the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander's entire area of responsibility and may contain more that one theater of operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Theater Strategy: The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Unified Action: A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and non-governmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Unified Command: A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Attachment 1
CINC's Major Roles and Responsibilities

The following is a list of the major responsibilities addressed in JP 1, JP 0-2, JP 3-0, and JP 5-0 for a unified CINC.

- Giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.

- Prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command.

- Organizing commands and forces within that command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.

- Employing forces within that command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.

- Assigning command functions to subordinate commanders

- Coordinating and approving those aspects of administration, support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training), and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.

- Exercising the authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders, selecting combatant command staff, suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial as delineated in chapter 6, title 10, US Code.

- Directive authority for logistic matters

- Participate actively in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), as follows:

    - Submit to CJCS comments and recommendations to be used in planning the proposed DOD policy, strategy, and force guidance for programming.

    - Provide guidance to subordinate command and components on warfighting requirements and priorities for addressing their program and budget requests to the respective Military Departments.

    - Provide an integrated priority list (IPL) of essential warfighting requirements prioritized across Service and functional lines for consideration by the Secretaries of the Military Departments, USCINCSOC, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense in developing the DOD program and budget.

- Enable coordination and facilitate relations with DOD Agencies

- Enable coordination and facilitate relations with coalition diplomats and military counterparts.

- Exercise or delegate COCOM, full authority to organize and employ commands

- Exercise or delegate OPCON of assigned or attached forces

- Coordinate the boundaries of geographic areas specified in the UCP with other combatant commanders and with other US Government agencies or agencies of countries in the AOR, as necessary to prevent both duplication of effort and lack of adequate control of operations in the delineated areas.

- Function, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, as the US military single point of contact and exercise directive authority over all elements of the command in relationships with other combatant commands, DOD elements, US diplomatic missions, other US agencies, and agencies of countries in the AOR.

Attachment 2
JFC's Roles and Responsibilities within a JTF

The following is a list of specific responsibilities addressed in JP 5-00.2:[54]

- Exercise directive for logistics for those common support capabilities deemed essential to the accomplishment of the mission.

- Must determine when OPCON of forces will be transferred to JFC authority.

- Develop a detailed OPORD and supporting time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) or campaign plan within the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) crisis action planning (CAP) guidelines. JFC must determine applicability of existing OPLANs, operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs), functional plans, and campaign plans, if any, to maximize the benefits of prior deliberate planning.

- Provide the commander's intent.

- Provide commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) to the JTF staff and components.
    - CCIR is a comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision making process that affect successful mission accomplishment.

- Request supplemental rules of engagement (ROE) needed to accomplish mission within the context of the political environment.

- Establish combat identification measures.

- Validate the adequacy of the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and notify the establishing authority when prepared to assume responsibility for the JOA.

- Ensure cross-Service support is provided and the force operates as an effective, mutually supporting joint team.

- Determining the requirement for and providing guidance on the establishment of the necessary boards, offices, centers, and bureaus (e.g., Joint Visitors Bureau (JVB), JMC, Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB), civil-military operations center (CMOC), IO cell) to enhance operational efficiency.

- Defining the area of operations (AO) within the JOA for land and naval force commanders and a joint special operations area (JSOA) for use by a joint force special operations component.

- Establishing force protection policies and guidelines. This responsibility includes an active counterintelligence (CI) effort to protect the JTF from foreign intelligence gathering activities, sabotage, and terrorism directed against personnel, facilities, or equipment.

- Using the assigned and attached forces to best perform the mission, requires the JFC to absorb an accurate assessment of the entire joint/multinational team. The strengths and weaknesses of the component forces must be known with an objective viewpoint.

- Identify the requirement for additional forces or personnel to the JTF establishing authority.
- Provide guidance to subordinate forces for planning and conducting operations, to include responsibilities with respect to supporting forces as directed by the JTF establishing authority.

- Monitor the operational situation and, as required, keep the JTF establishing authority informed.

- Coordinate with other forces and agencies not assigned or attached, including friendly forces and governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or private voluntary organizations (PVOs), as appropriate.

- Interagency Coordination – In certain situations, interagency coordination must be a top priority of the CJTF. During interagency operations, the JTF HQ must provide the basis for a unified effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. It is the operational focal point for interagency coordination.

- Understand that each organization brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the interagency effort. JTF must ensure an atmosphere of cooperation exists so that both the skills and resources of the JTF and interagency organizations can be more effectively and efficiently utilized. Unity of effort must be achieved.

- Establish, if necessary, a coordinating procedure for specific functions or activities among assigned, attached, and supporting forces.

- Establish the succession of command.

- Assigning to subordinate commanders those missions needed to accomplish the plan.

- Provide guidance to subordinate forces for the planning and execution of redeployment operations.

- Ensure "good order and discipline" can be maintained throughout the operation.

- Determine how best to ensure that space capabilities are incorporated throughout the plan and, that the staff is organized to represent these planning and operational requirements.

- Ensuring that the JTF HQ is organized to support the basic tenets of Information

Operations (IO).

Notes

[1] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, <u>Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States</u>, (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff, 14 November 2000), pg. i.

[2] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 0-2, <u>Unified Action Armed Forces</u>, (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff, 24 February 1995), pg. i-ii.

[3] Ibid, pg. vii-viii.

[4] Ibid, pg. viii.

[5] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, <u>Doctrine for Joint Operations</u>, (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff, 1 February 1995), pg. II-1.

[6] Dana Priest, "A Four-Star Foreign Policy?," <u>Washington Post</u>, 28 Sep 00, pg. A1.

[7] Joint Chiefs of Staff, "JCS Directive: Unified Command for Joint Operations, 20 April 1943 (JCS 263/2/D)," in <u>Joint Force Command</u>, ed. Dr. Stephen Coats (Ft Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, November 1999), pg. M2-8-1.

[8] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, <u>Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States</u>, (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff, 14 November 2000), pg. I-2.

[9] Ibid, pg. III-2.

[10] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 0-2, <u>Unified Action Armed Forces</u>, (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff, 24 February 1995), pg. II-14.

[11] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, <u>Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States</u>, (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff, 14 November 2000), pg. xi-xii.

[12] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 0-2, <u>Unified Action Armed Forces</u>, (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff, 24 February 1995), pg. IV-2 – IV-4.

[13] Ibid, pg. IV-5.

[14] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, <u>Doctrine for Joint Operations</u>, (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff, 1 February 1995), pg. II-14.

[15] Ibid, p. IV-3, Figure IV-1 modified by author to accentuate the functional component command structure option.

[16] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, <u>Doctrine for Joint Operations</u>, (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff, 1 February 1995), pg. II-11.

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[17] Ibid, pg. II-6.

[18] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, <u>Doctrine for Joint Operations</u>, (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff, 1 February 1995), pg. II-15.

[19] United States Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document-2, <u>Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power</u>, (Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Doctrine Center, 17 Feb 00), pg. 48.

[20] Amy Berry, "Vice CSAF Stresses Commitment to People," <u>U.S. Air Forces in Europe News Service</u>, (www.usafe.af.mil/news/news00/uns00115.htm: 11 Apr 00), pg. 1.

[21] Priest, Dana, "A Four-Star Foreign Policy?," <u>Washington Post</u>, 28 Sep 00, pg. A1.

[22] Ibid, pg A1.

[23] Elwyn Edwards, "Introductory Overview," <u>Human Factors in Aviation</u>, (San Diego: Academic Press Inc., 1988), pg 5.

[24] Ibid, pg 5.

[25] The term "staff team" was created by MG William Stofft in an essay entitled "Leadership at the Operational Level of War." It is defined as a group that consists of the commanders and his staff.

[26] Mica R. Endsley, "A Methodology for the Objective Measurement of Pilot Situational Awareness," <u>Situational Awareness in Aerospace Operations</u>, (Denmark: AGARD conference proceedings No. 478), pg. 2. The main ideas of Mr. Endsley were translated from the aviation vernacular to joint forces and a joint force commander by the author. The reasoning behind this jump is backed by the simple fact that the main ideas about situational awareness deal with cognitive processes. Whether discussing pilot or JFC issues, the cognitive processes remain the same for decision makers.

[27] The experts referred to comprise of a large group of authors that have written on the subject of RMA. This group consists of Michael O'Hanlon, Steven Metz, Carl H. Builder, and Eliot Cohen to name just a few. A great source of information on the topic of RMA can be found in the website, www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/overview.html.

[28] Mica R. Endsley, "A Methodology for the Objective Measurement of Pilot Situational Awareness," <u>Situational Awareness in Aerospace Operations</u>, (Denmark: AGARD conference proceedings No. 478), pg. 4.

[29] Gary Klien, <u>Sources of Power</u>, (Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999) pg 1.

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[30] Ibid, pg. 31-44.

[31] Barry H. Kantowitz and Patricia A. Casper, "Human Workload in Aviation," <u>Human Factors in Aviation</u>, (San Diego: Academic Press Inc., 1988), pg 157-159.

[32] Earl L. Wiener, "Cockpit Automation," <u>Human Factors in Aviation</u>, (San Diego: Academic Press Inc., 1988), pg 437.

[33] Richard S. Jensen, <u>Aeronautical Decision Making-Cockpit Resource Management</u>, (Ohio State University Research Foundation, Aviation Psychology Laboratory, January 1989) pg 51.

[34] Ibid, pg 51-52.

[35] Barry H. Kantowitz and Patricia A. Casper, "Human Workload in Aviation," <u>Human Factors in Aviation</u>, (San Diego: Academic Press Inc., 1988), pg 171-178.

[36] Louis Morton, "Pacific Command: A Study in Interservice Relations,"in <u>Joint Force Command</u>, ed. Dr. Stephen Coats (Ft Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, November 1999), pg. M2-7-5.

[37] Louis Morton, <u>The War in the Pacific: Strategy and Command: The First Two Years</u>, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1961), pg. 481.

[38] Louis Morton, "Pacific Command: A Study in Interservice Relations,"in <u>Joint Force Command</u>, ed. Dr. Stephen Coats (Ft Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, November 1999), pg. M2-7-5.

[39] Ibid, pg. M2-7-5.

[40] Louis Morton, <u>The War in the Pacific: Strategy and Command: The First Two Years</u>, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1961), pg. 498.

[41] Bruce Palmer, Jr., <u>The 25-Year War</u>, (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984), pg. 30.

[42] Ibid, p. 31.

[43] Ibid, pg. 33.

[44] William C. Westmoreland, from <u>A Soldier Reports</u>, Chapter 5, "Instability and Uncertainty: 1964-1965," in <u>Joint Force Command</u>, ed. Stephen Coats (Ft Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, November 1999), pg. M4-2-1.

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[45] Ibid, pg. M4-2-10.

[46] Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, <u>The General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf</u>, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), pg. 125.

[47] Richard B. Lewis, "JFACC Problems Associated with Battlefield Preparation in Desert Storm," <u>Joint Force Air Component Command Course Book</u>, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College), Reading E, pg. 3-4.

[48] Damian J. McCarthy and Susan A. Medlin, "Two Hats for the Joint Force Commander?," <u>Joint Force Quarterly</u>, (Institute for National Strategic Studies: Summer 2000, Number 25), pg. 98.

[49] H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, <u>General H. Norman Schwarzkopf: The Autobiography: It Doesn't Take a Hero</u>, (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), pg. 363.

[50] Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E. Trainor, <u>The Generals' War</u>, Little, Brown &Co, 1995, pg. 464.

[51] Ibid, pg. 476.

[52] A common military term to describe characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force or entity derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. In this case, the author is implying that the establishment of an efficient and effective command and control structure is fundamental to mission success.

[53] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 0-2, <u>Unified Action Armed Forces</u>, (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff, 24 February 1995), pg. xiv-xvi.

[54] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-00.2, <u>Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures</u>, (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff, 13 January 1999), pg. II-5 – II-10.

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